1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Lead Case No. 05-44481-rdd In the Matter of: DELPHI CORPORATION, ET AL., Debtors. United States Bankruptcy Court One Bowling Green New York, New York April 23, 2009 10:33 AM B E F O R E: HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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2	HEARING re Motion for Orders Approving Bidding Procedures;	
3	Approving Form and Manner of Sale Notices; and Setting Sale	
4	Hearing Date on the Sale of Debtors' Assets Comprising Debtors'	
5	Brakes and Ride Dynamics Business	
6		
7	HEARING re Motion to Compel the Payment of Administrative	
8	Expense Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 503(b)(1)(A)	
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10	HEARING re Motion to Disband Committee or suspend Equity	
11	Committee	
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13	HEARING re Proposed Forty-Second Omnibus Hearing Agenda	
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15	HEARING re Debtors' Reply in Support of Expedited Motion to	
16	Disband or Suspend Equity Committee	
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18	HEARING re Debtors' Reply in Support of Brakes and Ride	
19	Dynamics Business Sale Motion	
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21	HEARING re Notice of Hearing	
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25	Transcribed by: Sharona Shapiro	

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PROCEEDINGS

2 THE COURT: Delphi Corporation.

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MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, Jack Butler, Kayalyn

Marafioti and Ron Meisler here today on behalf of Delphi

Corporation for its forty-second omnibus hearing. We've filed,

as is customary, an agenda in the case for this hearing on the

docket at docket number 16570 and would ask to proceed in that

order.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, we have a number of motions that were scheduled today that have been adjourned to later dates.

Matters 1 and 2, the steering option exercise motion at docket number 16410 and the GM arrangement fourth and fifth amendment approval motion at docket number 16411, have already been adjourned at a chambers conference earlier this week to May 7, 2009.

And we have two creditor motions that have also been adjourned. The first of these is the motion of CXX Transport, Inc. to compel the payment of an administrative expense claim at docket number 16548. This deals with about 97 freight invoices, about 260,000 dollars in dispute. This is a pure trade claims reconciliation in the case, Your Honor. It's the debtors' view, and we believe the facts are, that we've paid all the invoices that have been submitted to us with proper

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modification hearing, papers that will reject this lease retroactive to that date. They've been on notice of that since last year.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BUTLER: And they've asked us to put this off. We've agreed to do it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda is matter number 5. This is the second accommodation amendment motion at docket number 16534. Your Honor approved this on an interim basis on April 3, 2009 at docket number 16549.

Your Honor, we also have, based on developments between the interim hearing and the final hearing, we've negotiated, as we were advised by the court order this week, we have negotiated further supplemental changes to this amendment and we filed a notice of these supplemental amendments at docket number 16573. As supplemented, this is the second amendment to the accommodation agreement between the debtors and the DIP lenders. The original accommodation agreement was approved back on December 3rd on docket number 14515, and the first amendment, as supplemented -- the supplemental amendment was approved by Your Honor on February 25, 2009 at docket number 16377.

Your Honor, the genesis, frankly, of these amendments

dates back to the fact that last month the auto task force in the United States Treasury blocked, at least on an interim basis, approval of the fourth and fifth amendments to the GM arrangement and the global steering business option exercise agreement. Those matters remain under negotiation with the auto task force, General Motors, and our DIP lenders, and we are continuing discussions, as Your Honor is aware, with those parties and other stakeholders, including our creditors' committee, regarding developing a term sheet for an appropriate resolution of these cases.

The changes that were made to the amendment that is before the Court now for final hearing adjusts the deadlines and milestones for those discussions as they are continuing. Specifically, the second supplemental amendment provides for an extension to May 4, 2009, back from April 17, of the deadline to deliver the DIP lenders a term sheet with GM and the Treasury Department with respect to the resolution of these cases. The first opportunity for an obligation for the debtors to be triggered with respect to the incremental borrowing base cash collateral would be May 5, 2009. There's a similar grace period, as there have been in the past, and there is an outside date for the accommodation period of May 9, 2009, in the event that the requisite percentages of participant lenders have not affirmatively notified Delphi that the term sheet delivered to them was satisfactory. So we've essentially taken the April

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dates and moved them into May as we continue these discussions.

There are a couple of other elements of changes that have been noticed out. These include the fact that if Your Honor approves this matter today, the future tranche, the interest payments would be applied and we'd pay the tranche A and tranche B DIP loans till those loans are repaid in full. The credit agreement would be amended to add the PBGC as a party to which the agents are required to provide copies of the notices prior to taking enforcement action against the collateral. Certain adjustments would be made to the definition of minimum borrowing base cash collateral account balances, and there would be a payment of an additional twenty basis point fee in connection with this. There would be a further paydown on the tranche A and B of twenty-five million dollars, and there would also be the payment of some related additional fees and expenses.

Your Honor, that's the substance of, I think, the material changes that were made that have been noticed out in connection with this. There have been no objections filed by any stakeholder, either at the interim or final hearings, save the statements that were filed at the initial hearing by the auto task force which were resolved at that hearing. And, Your Honor, the order here asks Your Honor to waive, to the extent applicable, the ten-day stay that may be imposed by Bankruptcy Rule 6004(h), as of today's date, because we need to take this

11 order on a final basis consistent with the DIP agreement and 1 2 implement the transactions proposed by it. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Let me just make sure -- I 4 received a blackline and clean copy of the second supplemental second amendment as well as the proposed final order. Have 5 there been any changes since that? 6 7 MR. BUTLER: No, Your Honor, there's not been. THE COURT: And I also received the expense letters 8 that involve two different arrangement fees dealing with the 9 10 administrative agent and the accommodation agent. Those are 11 the only two --MR. BUTLER: Yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: -- fees in addition to the --13 MR. BUTLER: That is correct. 14 THE COURT: -- to the twenty basis points fees that 15 are alluded to in the amendment? 16 MR. BUTLER: Correct, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Does anyone have 18 anything to say on this motion? Okay. 19 2.0 This was the subject of a chambers conference earlier 21 this week. I've reviewed the changes and I find them to be reasonable, and I will approve them. It clearly makes sense to 22 23 continue the discussions that now involve the auto task force, given their relationship to GM and the integral nature of GM's 24 25 role in the interim and final exit process for these debtors.

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So this is a valid exercise of the debtors' business judgment.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda is matter number 6. It's the brakes and ride dynamics businesses sale motion at docket number 16533. There was a response filed, which I'll address in a few minutes, by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation at docket number 16563.

Your Honor, this is a transaction in which the debtors propose to sell two businesses: their brakes businesses and their ride dynamics businesses, which were both categorized as noncore assets back in the debtors' 2006 transformation plan. The proposed purchaser is Beijing West Industries Co., Ltd. The selling entities are a combination of debtor and nondebtor entities. The debtor entities are Delphi Corporation, Delphi Automotive Systems, LLC, and Delphi Technologies, Inc. There are a number of nondebtor affiliates who are also selling this. The purchase price is ninety million dollars, subject to certain adjustments. Approximately thirty million of that is allocated to the selling debtor entities, and the balance of the purchase price and the majority of the assets are being sold outside of the debtor entities.

Today's hearing is really focused on approval of the bidding procedures, including the proposed breakup fee, which is three percent of the sum of the preliminary purchase price,

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approximately 2.94 million dollars. There is, in these procedures, a proposed auction process and notice process similar to the marketing we've done in the past with the other assets. As our papers indicate, these assets have been extensively marketed over the last several years, but we would give further notice again and provide a bid deadline of May 11th, an auction at May 15th, and we would come back here at the May omnibus hearing on May 21st for a final sale hearing.

Your Honor, just briefly, the brakes business produces brake systems and components ranging from traditional hydraulic brake systems to controlled brake products and other technology. The brake system also offers brake corner modules and a series of other assembled components. The brakes business has assets in China, the U.S., and Mexico, with two manufacturing facilities located outside of the United States, and engineering capabilities both here in the United States and outside of the United States.

The ride dynamics business has two product lines, a passive dampers line and an electrically controlled damping systems line. And it has significant manufacturing assets located in China, India, Mexico, Poland, and the United Kingdom, as well as engineering both within and outside of the debtor entities in the United States.

Just to give some indication of employee size, there are 843 employees that work for the brakes businesses. Of

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those, 149 are U.S. employees. Primarily all of those are salaried engineers. With respect to the rides dynamic business, there are about 2,000 -- a little over 2,100 employees. And of those, 124 are U.S. employees, again, primarily salaried engineers.

As I indicated, these assets have been extensively marketed since late 2007 and early 2008. There have been almost 200 potential buyers that have been solicited for this. There were more than fifty confidential information memoranda that were solicited. And there was a process that led to the transaction that is before the Court today.

Your Honor, I think the process we're using here is very similar to those that Your Honor has approved before. If there is a wrinkle in this particular bidding procedures hearing -- we're asking for approval of the bid protection for the bidding procedures -- it's that the PBGC filed the response that it did at docket number 16563. And the position that PBGC has taken is not one that we disagree with in terms of the basic assertion, which is that it simply wanted to make sure Your Honor's not trying to sell these assets free and clear of liens that may otherwise be enforceable in nondebtor entities. We're not asking the Court to do that. Our papers are clear in that respect. It's not a bidding procedures objection in the first instance, and anyway it would be a sale objection. But the objection, as it is filed, we think has no merit either at

the sale hearing or at this hearing. And I'm not going to really address it beyond that and beyond what's in our response, Your Honor, that we filed yesterday.

What it has done, though, is raised a question that we wanted to provide some clarity to the Court on, which is we're asking Your Honor to approve an almost three million dollar breakup fee here, and we wanted to have clarity on this record that the existence of these alleged liens, which the debtors dispute as to their enforceability, would not, in and of themselves, give rise to the purchaser being able to assert a termination event and then collect a breakup fee because of the existence of those.

And I would also tell the Court that the debtors are committed, prior to the completion of the sale hearing, to resolve these issues as to the sale on a final basis, either through a resolution with the PBGC so that they would acknowledge the sale would go forward without the assertion of those liens, or an acknowledgment from the buyer that they're prepared to close with the risk of those alleged liens out there, and therefore, these would be viewed as permitted encumbrances.

THE COURT: All right. Well, in light of the objection, I reviewed the proposed order, and perhaps with a little less care, the agreement. And I didn't see any obligation on the debtors' behalf to deliver the nondebtor

assets free and clear of liens.

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MR. BUTLER: There is no such obligation, but what there is, is this standard sort of out of bankruptcy court set of obligations in the contract of what's a permitted encumbrance and what's not a permitted encumbrance in that place. And what I wanted, Your Honor, is we're going to make sure that we have clarity on that between the debtors and --

THE COURT: But it's clear that the right to the breakup fee is not tied to a termination based on the existence of these liens -- these asserted liens.

MR. BUTLER: Based on the alleged existence of the liens.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BUTLER: Mr. Abramowitz is here on behalf of the purchaser. We've worked out probably six short paragraphs -- and they are relatively short, they're mostly sentences -- that we're going to add to the order on this to make sure that we've clarified it and there's comfort. But they have agreed that the mere existence of these purported liens, as filed in the D.C.'s reporter's office, without a successful action to enforce the purported liens, are not encumbrances for purposes of their right to a breakup fee.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTLER: And they've agreed that the purported liens would need to be enforceable in the local and applicable

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jurisdictions in order for those liens to be encumbrances.

There's a series of -- those are definitional things -- there's a series of agreements. We've agreed, among other things, to extend indemnities, to clarify what their termination rights would be without the breakup fee, and to take some other actions. We'll put this in the order and submit it to Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BUTLER: I'm not going to read all of the actual language into the record, but we wanted the Court to understand that the mere existence of these alleged liens in these foreign jurisdictions would not give you the right to approve this order today and for tomorrow the purchaser to say okay, pay me 2.9 million dollars.

I'd also point out that there is, for any alleged breach of the agreement by the sellers, there is a thirty-day notice and a thirty-day cure period. So we'd have, on this and any other breach, to the extent that the liens were deemed to be enforceable, there still would be a notice process they'd have to go through with us and an opportunity for us to resolve this on a commercial basis with them, and if need be, at that point in time, with the PBGC. But having said that, Your Honor, it is our intention, prior to the completion of the sale hearing, to resolve these nondebtor issues on a commercial basis.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BUTLER: The other thing I guess I want to mention, Your Honor, is we did submit a declaration from Mr. Stip (ph.), the company's director of restructuring here at Delphi. And I would ask Your Honor that that be admitted into evidence supporting his application.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone have any objection to that? All right, I reviewed it, and it will be admitted.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Steven
Abramowitz on behalf of the buyer, Beijing West Industries. I
concur, in concept, with what Mr. Butler described. We do have
a complicated series of e-mails that clarify the basic
agreement that'll be put into the order. But the basic
agreement is that we agree that because of the current state of
the purported liens being asserted by the PBGC, which the buyer
believes are not enforceable liens, because of that we would
not be entitled to the breakup fee. So for purposes of the
breakup fee, we're making that change. In exchange, there are
other clarifications, including an extension of the indemnity
with respect to liens. And that's going to be worked out in a
final order to be delivered --

THE COURT: All right, but I'm not approving that today -- the second point today, or am I?

MR. BUTLER: No, the only thing, Your Honor, that is in here, there are some clarifications to the document. The

19 agreement itself is subject to the final hearing. The only 1 2 thing that's being approved today are the bid procedures. 3 THE COURT: Okay, fine. All right, anything else on this motion? 4 MR. MENKE: Your Honor, John Menke with the PBGC. 5 just wanted to state for the record that based on the reply 6 that we received from the debtors and discussions with them and 7 what Your Honor said here this morning, we appreciate the 8 clarification that the free and clear language does not apply 9 to these foreign liens, and that we therefore have no other 10 11 objection with respect to the bid procedures. And so I suppose 12 we would, to the extent our pleading was deemed to be an objection to bid procedures, we'd be withdrawing that, subject 13 of course, to the possibility that this issue may rear its head 14 at the sale hearing and we're reserving our rights with respect 15 16 to that. 17 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ABRAMOWITZ: I'm sorry, I wanted to clarify one 18 thing. The point about that we are given an extended indemnity 19 2.0 right, that will be in the order that's being approved today. 21 MR. BUTLER: The indemnities are in the agreement. 22 MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Right. MR. BUTLER: I mean, the agreement doesn't get final 23 approval. The only thing that's ever approved at a bid 24

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procedures order are the bid procedures.

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20 1 MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Okav. 2 MR. BUTLER: The final approval of the indemnity will 3 be in the sale agreement approved at the sale hearing. MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Correct, but there will be a 4 reference to the indemnity in the --5 MR. BUTLER: Yes. 6 7 THE COURT: The debtors have amended the underlying purchase agreement to include that provision. 8 MR. BUTLER: Correct. 9 THE COURT: And that's a provision that they'll be 10 11 showing to others as the stalking horse bid. 12 MR. BUTLER: Correct. 13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Thank you. 14 THE COURT: All right. In light of all of those 15 16 clarifications on the record, I'll approve the bid procedures order and the related breakup fee. The procedures are 17 reasonable in light of the efforts that the debtors have 18 19 already undertaken to market these assets, the notice that they 2.0 contemplate to various parties is appropriate, and the breakup 21 fee itself, in light of the size of the transaction, is reasonable. 22 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, the 23 last matter on the agenda for today, matter number 7, is the 24 25 debtors' expedited motion to expand or suspend the equity

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committee, at docket number 16558. This was filed with the consent of the creditors' committee under the supplemental case management order. And the only objection that's been filed has been filed by the equity committee at docket number 16565, who also filed a declaration of its chairman, which has also been filed publicly at docket number 16566. The creditors' committee has filed a statement in support of the debtors' motions at docket number 16568, and we filed our reply yesterday.

Your Honor, essentially, because of the circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases, we're asking Your Honor today to enter an order, either disbanding or suspending the equity committee, or directing the U.S. Trustee to do so. The reason that we have brought this matter to the Court is that the administrative process that was embarked on informally by the debtors last fall and formally by the creditors' committee this spring and then joined in by the debtors, did not result in a satisfactory result that would have addressed the issues and concerns of the debtors involving the use of estate resources. We did not describe that process in great detail. The equity committee elected, in its filings, to disclose all of the letters that support that administrative process in Exhibits A to I of Mr. Yacoub's (ph.) declaration. And so I would refer to those -- and they're now part of the record -- as to that administrative process.

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I would, Your Honor, point back to Your Honor's order in docket number 30244 which originally approved the appointment of an equity committee here. In paragraph 7 of that order, Your Honor indicated that the Court would entertain a motion to disband the equity committee if subsequent circumstances support the conclusion that the debtors appear to be hopelessly insolvent. And then it goes on to discuss other conditions which are inapplicable here.

Your Honor, from the debtors' perspective, as we said in our papers, we believe that the members of the equity committee have performed their functions appropriately in these cases. We think they've acted in good faith. We believe they have been given appropriate counsel by their professionals.

And the debtors do not have issues with any of that, and we've made that pretty clear in our record -- in our pleadings. We just believe that, based on the facts and circumstances of this case as they now exist, that the costs of an equity committee are no longer justified, and the existence of an equity committee when there is no reasonable possibility that there would be any distribution to them, that the work of that committee should now conclude.

So we filed that motion, Your Honor. I'm not going to speak beyond the papers that have said that, other than I did want to make the statements on the record about the debtors' views of the responsible nature in which the committee

has performed its functions to this date, but I ask that Your Honor grant the relief requested in the motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. STEINGART: Good morning, Your Honor. Bonnie
Steingart from Fried, Frank on behalf of the equity committee.

It's been three years since the equity committee's appointment.

And as you can see from the affidavit of our chairman that was filed, the members of the equity committee continue to be willing to serve. And the members of the equity committee believe that this is not an opportune time or the correct time to disband the committee. The debtor is on the brink of proposing yet another modification to its plan, and indeed, it's one that's eagerly awaited by all parties, and certainly the debtors' emergence is something that all of us hope occurs and hope occurs with the debtor as intact as possible.

But in connection with those additional filings, there will be numerous third party releases that are requests, some of which will be from equity holders. And to the extent that the equity committee had a role to begin with, and continues to have a role, it's with respect to addressing those releases and making whatever presentations can be made in support of the equity holders' continuing rights, if any, to pursue claims.

As Mr. Butler has indicated, the individuals who serve on the equity committee have served in good faith for a

number of years. In a sense, they're volunteers. It was the U.S. Trustee that solicited, among all the equity holders, individuals to volunteer to be part of this committee. And these individuals have volunteered and have served over this period of time, often at the expense of their own interests in being able to, at earlier points in time, trade out of these securities at higher prices. They certainly don't begrudge that, and as I said, are happy to continue to serve and believe that they do have a function. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, I take it from your remarks, as well as from Mr. Sheller's (ph.) letter to the U.S. Trustee, that was in response to Mr. Rosenberg's letter on behalf of the creditors' committee that your focus and his focus was on a very limited issue, which is it appears that there's a view, which is certainly understandable, that the only realistic opportunity, even as an opportunity for a recovery by shareholders, is really in respect of claims against third parties that may, for one reason or another, get covered by release in a plan. Is that fair?

MS. STEINGART: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. STEINGART: And also at earlier points in this

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THE COURT: Oh, no, I'm leaving aside earlier points.

25 It's clear to me there's been a substantial change in

25 1 circumstances --2 MS. STEINGART: Right. THE COURT: -- from what occurred earlier in the 3 4 I did not take away from -- how do you pronounce it, Mr. Yacoub --5 MS. STEINGART: Mr. Yacoub's. 6 THE COURT: -- Yacoub's letter or affidavit, that the 7 members of the committee viewed the professional's role as 8 limited in that way. And I can understand that view because 9 those who serve on an official committee are fiduciaries for, 10 11 in this case, the shareholders. And that means that they have fiduciary duties to look into all sorts of issues whenever the 12 specter of fiduciary duty arises. Notwithstanding the 13 qualified immunity that people have when they serve on a 14 committee, their inclination is to look at other issues. 15 16 that, for example, if a plan came out, they would look not only at the release provisions, but ask you and perhaps Houlihan to 17 say well, what is it -- you know, is this really the right 18 19 projection as far as valuation is concerned, even though it 2.0 appears that that would be a totally academic exercise. MS. STEINGART: Right. At this point, the committee 21 is really only seeking to have the services of its legal 22 23 advisors and not the other advisors that were retained: one in connection with the investor litigation and the other being 24 25 Houlihan. You know, there was also the issue --

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THE COURT: But legal advisors can look at all sorts of things besides a release.

MS. STEINGART: Well, the difficulty was that many of the materials that the debtors do provide to the committee are materials that are for professional eyes only. So it's not a matter of following up on issues that are unrelated to the releases. What it is, is a matter of the committee members themselves not being able to read many of the materials that are directed to them as committee members. That really created the tension when there was the effort made to have just the committee members serve and not to have the expense --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. STEINGART: -- you know, of professionals. But then two days later arrived a package of materials where really only professionals could read them. And everyone's best hopes and plans were sort of shown to be not possible.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MS. STEINGART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does anyone else have anything to say on this motion? Mr. Masumoto, should I take the U.S. Trustee's last word on this, the last letter in the exhibit package which is your response to Yacoub's letter?

MR. MASUMOTO: Yes, Your Honor. And I guess just for the record, part of our concern at the later stages of the negotiations was the concept of a committee that would exist

without any fiduciary obligations. And we --

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THE COURT: Well, it would clearly have to have fiduciary obligations. The issue is whether they could exercise those without professionals in a case of this complexity. I mean, there are cases where committees are able to operate without professionals, but I understand Ms.

Steingart's point that this is probably not that type of case.

MR. MASUMOTO: I understand, Your Honor. And from our standpoint, to the extent that there were any controls on the costs involved that would allow the committee to remain in place, certainly from our standpoint, we view that as an objectionable circumstance.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MASUMOTO: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone else? I have before me a motion by the debtors for an order directing the U.S.

Trustee to disband the official committee of equity security holders or alternatively to suspend its activities.

Actually, let me ask you, Mr. Masumoto, on the second point, on the suspension point, does the U.S. Trustee believe that could happen, whereby that the committee would not be an official committee as of this time, but if some issue arose, you wouldn't have to form a new committee, you could just go to these individuals?

MR. MASUMOTO: Once again, it may be a question of

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nuance, again, but I did want to articulate again, as I stated before, the concern is the existence of a committee with no fiduciary obligations. If the suspension is treated, in fact, in lieu of a form of disbandment, then --

THE COURT: It would just save the administrative step of having to go out and solicit new people.

MR. MASUMOTO: Right. I understand, Your Honor, and in that case, again, if the idea of a suspension, in fact, indicates that any members who do operate and negotiate would not be doing so on behalf of the constituency. Again, that's our concern --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MASUMOTO: -- that a committee be in existence but not have a fiduciary obligation.

THE COURT: I understand. All right. So let me repeat. I have before me a motion by the debtors for an order directing the U.S Trustee to disband the official committee of equity security holders or alternatively to suspend their activities without any further date in mind. The motion is premised upon what appears to be at this point an undisputed fact, which is that looking to the debtors' own assets, there appears to be no reasonable prospect of a recovery in these cases by shareholders, pre-petition shareholders. And consequently, that the continued service of an official committee is no longer warranted, since the ultimate purpose of

a committee of that nature will be to obtain a merited or an earned or a proper recovery by its constituents, the shareholders. Rather, as I stated in my ruling appointing or authorizing the appointment of an official equity committee, in the circumstances where it appears clear that there would be no such recovery, the existence of an official committee would, since it's funded out of the debtors' estate, would in effect be a gift, and gifts are not permitted in this context.

The order appointing or authorizing the appointment of the official committee, as well as my bench ruling, clearly contemplated this possibility. The bench ruling noted that the request to form an equity committee came early in the cases, and that in the particular context of these cases, that timing was appropriate. That was in light of the fact that the debtors' Chapter 11 cases were not merely going to be cases where the capital structure would be adjusted, but rather were cases where the debtors, a) were attempting to engage in major transformations of their business, and b) were dealing in an environment where their business and industry itself was subject to major transformation. Given that uncertainty, and the possibility, at the time, that those two transformative possibilities could result in some recovery by shareholders, I believed it was important for the debtors, in their negotiations and analysis, to have the input of an official equity committee.

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I noted several times, however, in the ruling, that depending upon how the transformational solutions actually occurred, and how the debtors' business and industry might be transformed, could well result in a second look at the continued existence of an equity committee. For example, at page 181 of the transcript I stated, "I also will look very carefully at whether the continued incurrence of fees is appropriate at various stages in the case when picture on valuation becomes clearer."

The order itself directing the appointment of the official committee stated in the factual findings section that, quote, "Under the present circumstances, and subject to the terms and conditions of this order, it is a proper exercise of the Court's discretion to direct such an appointment." And then, as Mr. Butler noted, in paragraph 7 of the order, the order provided that "The Court will entertain a motion to disband the equity committee if subsequent circumstances support the conclusion that the debtor appears to be hopelessly insolvent."

Unfortunately, although the debtor, I believe, has been able to fulfill the goals it set itself for transforming its business, the transformation in its industry has gone in a different direction. And I believe -- and I believe this is uncontroverted on this record, that at this time it appears clear that the debtor will, under any scenario, not be able to

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make a distribution to its pre-petition shareholders from its own assets. That's reflected, among other things, by the trading prices on the debt that are highlighted in footnote 6 of the motion, as well as the pleadings and representations in court by the equity committee today.

Under those circumstances, it appears to me to be appropriate not to subject the members of the equity committee to continued service acting as a fiduciary for shareholders who appear to have no hope of a recovery from these debtors. It's equally appropriate not to saddle the debtors' estate with the cost of maintaining such a committee. I agree with the U.S. Trustee that in this context, in a case of this complexity, it would not be appropriate to permit the committee to serve without at least counsel. And I believe that obviously there's no prospect of counsel doing this on a pro bono basis, nor should there be. So there would obviously be a direct cost to the estate of continuing the committee in existence.

In addition, there's an indirect but very meaningful cost of continuing to have the committee in existence, which is the necessity of the other parties-in-interest, obviously including the debtor, but also the other key parties-in-interest, to incur costs in dealing with the equity committee and its professionals.

It has been suggested that there is still a potential recovery, or potential for recovery by shareholders in this

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case, not from the debtors' assets, but from potentially a price that might be paid by third parties who would be receiving a release in the case, in respect of rights and claims against them that are not the debtors or a derivative of the debtors' rights, but would be uniquely individual shareholders' rights. I believe that first, that prospect is one that is, at least based on the current record, speculative. Secondly, I don't believe it is a prospect that the estate should be paying for. It is a fairly discrete legal issue that many courts have dealt with, including most recently the Second Circuit in the Johns-Manville litigation, which is currently sub judice at the Supreme Court. I don't believe it is an issue that requires a continuing functioning committee to address. Rather, if and when such release is sought, I believe that there are sufficient incentives for those who may have unique claims against potentially released parties to raise their issues at that time.

I considered, as reflected by my question of Mr.

Masumoto, whether instead of disbanding the committee, I should issue an order suspending the committee. But I believe that while perhaps the order could make it clear that the committee would, during its time of suspension have no fiduciary duties, and that the suspension would only be a procedural mechanism to avoid the delay involved in creating a new committee, should the need ever arise, it appears to me that the suspension of a

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committee would raise more issues than it would potentially solve. And it would not be clear to me, if I were a member of such a suspended committee, what my duties and obligations were, for example, in respect of trading and the like.

And consequently, it seems to me that the proper course here is to disband the committee in light of the occurrence of the condition that I quoted from in my order originally appointing the committee. And that if in fact there ever is a time when it makes sense to reappoint a committee, these individuals may still be willing to serve, but recognizing that there was a true gap in between when they were not fiduciaries, except of course, in respect of any sort of ongoing obligation or in respect of confidentiality and the like from what they learned when they were serving.

So again, I will grant the debtors' motion and issue an order directing the U.S. Trustee to disband the committee.

I believe I clearly have the power to do so under the Texaco case from this district as well as the conditions in my own order which contemplated this possibility.

In doing so, I want to state, as Mr. Butler stated, that I see no evidence at all of any sort that the committee acted in any way improperly. There were other potential conditions in my order that stated that if the committee or its professionals did act improperly I would also issue an order disbanding the committee. That's clearly not the case here.

34 The only reason for disbanding the committee is the debtors' 1 2 present and foreseeable financial condition and the absence of 3 any prospect of a recovery by the shareholders. But again, from all that I have seen, the committee has acted responsibly 4 in this case in the representation of its constituency, as have 5 the committee's professionals. 6 So in addition to submitting the orders on the bid 7 procedures and the supplemental second amendment, the discs on 8 those orders, Mr. Butler, you should submit the order directing 9 the U.S. Trustee to disband the committee. 10 MR. BUTLER: We will, Your Honor. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, that completes the agenda 13 for this morning. Thank you very much. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 15 16 IN UNISON: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings concluded at 11:21 a.m.) 17 18 19 2.0 21 22 23 24 25

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